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Access to Justice and Civil Forfeiture Reform:
Providing Lawyers for the Poor and Recapturing
Forfeited Assets for Impoverished Comrnunities
Lo uis S. Rulli'
Since its in cep tion , the nation al legal services program has faced se rious political opposition and formidabl e ch allenges to fulfilling the promise of equal access to justice for the nation 's poor.' The 104th Congress
presented leg al se rvices programs with th eir most difficult challenges to
date: reduced federal funding by almost o ne-third, th e larges t sin gle-yea r
2
funding reducti o n in the history of the p rogram, and sweeping restrictions imposed upon th e activities of le ga l se rvices lawye rs.' With such
dram atic chan ges as a backdrop , Yale L aw School co nven ed the first annual Arthur Liman Coll oq uium' to bring together legal se rvices la wyers,
private a ttorneys, and members of the acade my to examin e the futur e of
civil legal se rvices to th e poor.
Law scho o ls were appropria te ly includ ed in this challenge . T hey we re
urged to tak e concrete ste ps to respond to the growing unme t legal nee ds
of th e poor by, amon g o ther things, ad op ting m a ndatory pub lic service
5
progra ms in law school , ex panding clini ca l progra ms to otTe r law stui· Prac tice Assoc ia te Profe ssor o f Law. Universi ty of P c nn sy!van i~1 Law Sch ool. T he aut hur
is gratd ul to i'vl a tth..:w !vlcD o na ld. Li ncol n F rakes. a nd Gabri·: b Fem c·n ia . th r..:c c xcci lc: nt Ia\\·
student s. fo r the ir v:.JIU~ibk assistance .
See. e.g.. Vice -Presid en t Spiro T. Agnew. Whur 's Wru ng <vir lillie !. ega/ Scr t ias Cu rpum lion, 58 A .B.A. J. Y3l) ( l'J 72): No te:. Th e L egal Ser vices Corpo r111ion: Cu noiling l'olilicu/fl/[ er fc rencc.8 l YALEL..I. 2:> 1 ( I'J7l).
2. \Vhik the 10-l th ConQ ress did not succeed in c lim ina tinl! cdl fcJe rcd fundin<! to th e: Lc l!a l
Serv ices Co rporat i<m. fc: dcr7ll fund ing wa s reduc ed fr om S-115 ~11i l liun w just S2 7~ m illi on. T he
prev ious la rge st sin gle year reduction in fed eral fun ding lh::cur rc: d h.:l\\·ccn fi SL\ d ~·c~Hs . J. ,9;-) t an d
l <J82 when federa l funding was red uced bv one-fourt h .
.3. Con gress impose d sc:,· ~ re res trict ions whi ch str uck at the core u f the: in clcpc nd c nce o f
legal se rvices lawvc: rs. Among oth er thin gs. the restrict io ns prohib it ad min istr ~ ttive an d kg islativ·co ad voca cv. c h ~il k n g cs to welfare reform legisl at ion and pol icies . rcprc:;c: ntatio n of imm igran ts wh o are rwr la\\'ful permanent resid e nts. liti gation on beh a lf uf pri sone rs. rcprc:s ent~ltio 11
of publ ic ho usin g res ide nts th re ate ned wi th ev iction base d upun a ll ege d drug ac tivitv. pro hibition of cla ss act ion sui ts an d claims for a tt o rn ey"s fees. Sec Omni bus Cons olid ate d P.csc iss ions
and Appro priati ons Act o f 19'J6 . Pu b. L 104-1 3-1. 11 () St:lt. U2l (I 'Nil) I Bud~ c t A ct of 1<J')6.
:ili.J(a )): sec ulso LS C reg ul ati ons impleme nting restrictions. 61 Fed. R.eg. -1 ! 9hil (A ug 13. 1')96) .
I 'J% \V L -15~-l.J'J. nI Fed . Reg. -157 -10 (Au g 29. 1996). 19% \VL .J:->'JS l3
-1. Th e Colloqu ium was he ld March 5-6. 19'J8. and vv·as co->pnns,J recl lw th e Ya ie La"
Sc hoo l Public Serv·ice Program and the Jerome K Frank Lega l Serv·icc:s O r ~ ;:ni z :H i on.
5. Fur ex am ple. the Un iversity of Pennsy lvania Law Sc hn nl req uires ikll ;\II stud e nt s pe rfo rm 71) huurs of publ ic service \IS a co ndi ti o n o f gradua tio n.
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dents exp erienti al le arning opportunities while sa tisfying the lega l nee ds
of impove ri shed clients, an d pe rfo rming needed resea rch and coordination functions in th e wake of fede ral defundin g of lega l services back-up
6
centers. Above all, law schools were expected to integrate stron g pro fession a l resp onsibi lity values into all aspe cts of th e established curriculum.
so that future lawyers would appreci ate th eir unique role in providing access to justice for all Americans and in employing th e rule of law to rem7
edy pe rvasi ve di sc riminati on base d up on povc rty.
In short, th e co lloquium call e d upon each of its participant const ituencies to join in new and innovative ways to insure that leg a l services
programs succee d well into the future despite current adversities. Th e urge ncy of this m essage was heighten ed by the knowl edge that a seri o us
co nst itutio nal challe nge to the na tion 's second largest funding so urce for
civil legal se rvices- the Interest On Lawyer Tr ust Acco unt program
( IOLT A)' -was bri efe d and argued, and awa iting decision by th e U. S.
Supreme Co urt."
As constituent gro ups shared with each o ther impress ive inn ovations
from their loca l communities. there was an opportunity to refl ect upon
the many ways tha t law students e nro ll ed in clinical co urses were alrea dy
co ntributing to thi s mission a nd how, through in cre as ed coord in ation
with legal se r vices and pro bono co mmunities, th ese efforts could be
strengthen ed in the future. Two examp les from curren t clinical initiat ives
at the Unive rsit y of Pennsylvania Law School came quickly to mind.
First clinica l faculty sho uld exp ress ly coo rdin a te their case acceptance polici es with the prio ritie s of lega l se rvices programs so th a t fa culty
give grea te r emph asis to cases th at lega l se rvices lawye rs a re prohibited
from handling und er curre nt federal res tricti ons. Fo r e xample. legai
se r vices lawyers em ployed in p rograms th at rece ive federal funding may

6. The Budget Ac t uf ILJ9il e liminat ed federal fundir. g to a ll I ll of the LSC s Nat iun a \ S up·
r•ort Cente rs. a ll 50 State S u pport Units. LS Cs five Regi,1na l Tra ini ng C en ters. s i\ C \LK
un it s. a nd th e :\'a ti ona l Ckarin~h o usc for Lc~a\ Ser\'i ces (publisher of the Clearinglwusc Re·
, ·ie,,·. the po,· ert y law jo urnal for kg•li ser\'iccs \aw\'er s).
7. For m e r Pres id ent J imm,· Ca rte r. in a recen t co mm e nceme nt add ress at the U n i,·ersit y of
Pe nn sy lva ni a. stated that ·· the wurst discrimination on eart h is ric h peo ple agai nst poor pc·up k.
This is no t a d c liber•lte d iscr iminatiun. l t" s not filled with h:Hred o r animos it Y. but it perm ca tc s
the human race .·· Comn1.:nce mcnt Addre ss dc \i v<: red on May l S. !99S in Phi l:1de lphia. reprint<',/
in part . \VIw are rl1e Rit:h Peup ie' . PH I LA. \ ~()UIR.F. R. May 26. 1998 . at A J3.
8. IO LTA prog rams genera te mo re tha n S lUlJ mill io n annua ll v for civil le gal sc r,· icc s . St'e
Brief of Amic i Cur iae in Suppnrt o l the Petit ioners at ''' l l. Phillips,._ Washington Le ga l Foundat ion. ] l)l)S \VL 309070 (U.S llJLJ:':) (l\u. \16 -157,~) ( Br ief available at \9LJ 7 WL -+711~(!11).
LJ. On June 15. l9<JS. the U.S. Supreme Cou rt hel d. bv a na rrow 5-4 m a rgi n. th <tt int e res t
incom e ge nerated bv fu nd s held in IOLT.'\ •tccou nts is tht: p riva te p rope rt Y of the ow ner llf th e
pr incipaL Howc,·cr. the Court exprc>> iv took no view on whc· ther \OL T 1\ fu nd s co nstitute :1
t•tking under Fifth Amendment j uri s prlllkncc nr \\' heth er just co mpensation is due. These: i:<s ucs
we re remand ed to the Fifth Ci rcuit f,ll. further co nsid e ration. See Phillips, .. Washin g ton LL:g•tl
Fo un d:tti o n. I I S S Ct. i'J~5 ( ILJ% ).
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no longer represent public housing tenants facing eviction based upon
alleged drug activity. Without legal services lawyers to help, many families will wrongfully lose subsidized housing and be unable to pay for
comparable housing in the private market. The results will be disastrous:
some families will become homeless and be forced to live in shelters or
on the streets: others will split up and assign children to overcrowded
homes of family relatives; still others will move into uninhabitable and
unsafe apartments. Obviously, clinical programs can play a vital role in
safeguarding the rights of tenants who otherwise would receive no legal
help at all.
Clinical programs will also benefit from undertaking these cases.
They are excellent teaching cases for law students because they involve
extensive client and witness interviewing, sophisticated factual investigation and development of evidence, case planning, negotiation and incourt representation. Perhaps more importantly, law students must leave
sheltered law school environments to visit public housing projects where
they directly confront the face of poverty, sometimes for the first time.
and learn how a growing underclass of American society struggles for its
daily survival. As the legal process unfolds, clinical supervisors help students to wrestle with agency incompetence and maliciousness. opposing
counsel intransigence. and the rigidity and unfairness of a national ''one
slrikc·· policy" that purports to justify the eviction of a iong-tirne tenant1
grandm ot her for the a lleged sins of her adult grandson. ' Students learn
the importance of having a lawyer at one's side in administrative and judicial systems that are intimidating and unforgiving (and th ey rightfully
q uestion vvhy Congress has taken away an indigent tenant's lawyer just
when legal help is needed most). Students observe the powerful rok that
lawyers play in the drafting of policies and administrative regu lations and
in the counseling ol governmental clients when vital interests are at stake.
T hese are powerful lessons not readily learned in the classroom.
!(I

iiJ.
-+l~'h)

Sec Budget Act of lli<J6.

~

::i0-+(a)(l7i: sec ui1D LSC Interim Regulation. hl

F ~ d.

Rc".

(,..\.ugusll3, 19Sl6).

!I. Notice P!H 'Xi-In (I·!A ) issued on A pril 12. l'i%. bv the U.S. Department of llousing
~'i nd U rh~tn

DL'vcloprncnt on tlh::: ~ubjc:ct of --on e strike and you·re uut" ~cr<::cning and ~:: v ictl o i1
guidc:l)ne:s fur public housing ~luthoritics. Th,_: notice provides guidanc:.:: for stri cter ='LTC-.:iling
~l!:d c\'ictiun policiL·s fo!]o\ving the President"s announccn1ent on ~vlan:h 2S. ! 0Y6. ()f :1 ··on~_·
strike and you·rc out"' policy.
1:2. The '"tlfk' strike .. pulicy \\·urks inju stice in In a ny Lunily cuntcxts but pcrh:tps mtY ·_.i. fr;_·qu•-.:ntly '.vhcn muthcr::.: and grandmothers. who have lived rc~ponsib!y in pubiic hou~ing fut·
many years. Llce eviction because uf the alleged wrongdoing of their aJult childrc:n ur ~rand 
children. Polici es such as these r{tis,_: in1purtant legal and non-kgal que sti o ns that shc:uld b·-.:
·~·lc>Sd~ L'X cunincd \\ ith c1ctual experience. nut cmly by future public interest bwycrs but a i ~ u by
future curp o r~He <.tnd government Lt\Yy crs \Yho \\'ic!d consickr~1 hl e influL·ncc u\·cr the fon11~1tiun
of pul-dic policy.
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In addition to providing representation in restricted cases, law school
clinical programs should also assist legal services programs by identifying
unrestricted cases that pose potential loss of shelter, income, or safety to
indigent clients, but which historically have not received legal help from
the local legal community. In such areas, the rights of the poor are particularly vulnerable because administrative and judicial proceedings routinely take place without the scrutiny of lawyers. For example, the clinical
program of the University of Pennsylvania Law School has undertak en
representation in a limited number of civil forfeiture cases in which the
homes of indigent families are at stake . These cases provide law students
(and faculty) with an unobstructed view of how poor people often lose
their most important asset-their homes-without any assistance of
counsel to safeguard their interests against erroneous government intrusion. The poor are literally driven onto the streets or into overburdened
city shelters creating higher tax burdens on the general community, while
the proceeds from the forced sale of their homes go to enrich law enforcement agencies.
These cases allow students to witness the harsh consequences of punitive forfeiture statutes that permit the exercise of enormous police powe r
but which fail to provide adequate safeguards against wrongful governmental action. Without legal representation, the scales of justice are
grossly unbalanced, providing students with an experience that dramatically contrasts with their classroom study of appellate cases in which all
litigants appear to be represented by experienced counsel who skillfully
argue the finer points of law to their clients ' advantage. The re is si m ply
no hiding the fact that the adversarial system doesn't work as it should
when disadvantaged and unsophisticated individuals are forced to stand
alone in defending their property against superior governmental resources. Once this genic is out of the bottle , If can never go back in. T he
hope is that the experience transforms students into enthusiastic advocates for a just legal system that serves the needs of the powerless as we ll
as the powerful.
Clinical involvement in cases such as these also permits law schools w
fulfill their historic role of identifying and writing about n eeded legal reform. While limited in number. the experiences gain e d fr o m representing
indigent homeowners in state civil forfeiture proceedings and o bserving
others who proceed without counse l demonstrate that o verall forfeiture
reform is seriously overdue. The balance of this Pa per calls for three specific changes in the civil forfei ture system intended to achieve measurab le
progress in balancing the important interests at stak e in these proce edings: court-appointed counsel for indigent property owners ; detailed.
public accounting of all assets forfeited annually to law enforcemen t
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authorities; and redirection of not less than fifty percent of forfeited asset
funds from law enforcement agencies to the creation of special services
districts in high poverty communities, so that drug prevention and community empowerment services, including free civil legal services to the
poor, can be purchased for community benefit.
Civil asset forfeiture is based on the legal fiction that propertyhomes, vessels, cars and even cash-can be found guilty of wrongdoing
13
and thereby be subject to forfeiture to the government. While there are
1
many federal forfeiture statutes, ' civil forfeiture became a weapon in the
war against drugs with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
15
Prevention and Control Act of 1970. As amended, the Act provided for
16
the forfeiture of controlled substances and conveyances used to trans17
1
port controlled substances, moneys and negotiable instruments, ' and
real propertiy used to facilitate violations. Civil asset forfeitures increased enormously when Congress revised the federal drug forfeiture
program to create this " surgical strike" weapon in the war on drugs."' The
purpose of this change was to strike a fatal blow at drug traffickers by
taking away their cars , boats, airplanes, homes, and cash, while simultaneously increasing the resources of the seizing agency. Once seized and
forfeited, the property may be destroyed, retained for official usc by law
enforcement agencies participating in the seizure and forfeiture, or sold.
Proceeds from the sale of forfeited assets were formerly deposited in the
general fund of the U.S. Treasury but now flow primarily to the Depart21
ment of Justice 's Asset Forfeiture Fund and the Department of the
Treasury's Forfeiture Fund'' to be used for law enforcement purposes. ' '
As of June 30. 1990. the seized asset inventories of the two programs
were valued at $1.167 billion and $389 million, respectively, totaling
$1.556 billion in assets. After deducting for expenses estimated to be
$55.4 million , the two programs netted a huge surplus. In fiscal year 1991
alone , the Department of Justice Assd Forfeiture F und reported income

13. See H.R. Rep. No. lil'i-3:i8. Part I. at 20 (summarizing antecedents ol civil asse t lurlciturc as background materials fur rcpurt on Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act. H.R. llJ6:i).
l-L Sec. e.g .. 18 US.C.) 2344 (c igarettes). 7 US.C. ~ 21:5o (gamecock s). 18 U.S.C. ~ 1l)li3
(RICO \iolation property).
1:i. 21 U.S.C. ~ 881(a).
11i. Sec21ljSC~8i:ll(a)(l).
17. See21US.C.~1-JS1(~)(4).
IS. See21 U S.C. ~ 001(a)(6) (llJ7S).
I'!. Sec 21 U S.C.~ :-l81(a)(7) (1LJ:S-l).

2U. See. e.g .. Mich~k M. Jochn~r. Fru111 FiClion ru Facr: The Suprc111c Cuur(s Rc-Ftoluoriun
of Cit·i/ A.1se1 hnj~irure Law1. :-\2 I I.L. B.J. 51i0 ( ll)94 ).
21. 28 U.S.C !:i 52-l(c)(-l ) .
22. 31 U S.C. ~ 9703.
23. See 2S U .S. C.~ 52-l(c)( 1).
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of $658 million and expenses of $118 million, netting a surplus of $464
24
million.
State and local law enforcement agencies can receive a portion of forfeited assets in return for cooperating with the Department of Justice and
Customs Service in seizure and forfeiture cases. The amounts of shared
funds have also increased significantly and state and local law enforcement authorities have increasingly relied upon shared assets for their
budgetary operations.'; In addition, individual states have adopted their
own civil forfeiture laws modeled upon the Uniform Controlled Sub27
2
stances Act. " For example, in 1988 Pennsylvania enacted legislation
providing for the loss of property rights to the Commonwealth for violations of the state Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
2
Act. ' The state law directs that the district attorney and the state attorney general utilize forfeited property or proceeds therefrom for the pur29
pose of enforcing the provisions of the same Act.
In recent years. the civil asset forfeiture program has attracted growing criticism. Since the program is civil in nature, it does not contain the
constitutional safeguards mandated in criminal cases and it places property owners at risk for loss of their property without ever being convicted
or even charged with a crime."' As a result, commentators have charged
that the use of forfeiture has become too widespread and that the war on
1
dr ugs has become a ··war on the Constitution. '''
The public is also genuinely concerned that the government's strong
pecuniary interest in civil forfeiture creates a potential conflict of interest
that threatens to distort valid police goals, thereby encouraging law enforcement officers to maximize reven\1e at the expense of crime prevention." A former D e partment of Justice Chief responsible for the Asset
Forfeiture Section stated that the department's "marching orders" were:

:24. Sec Alison Roberts Sulomon. Dmgs uwl Mnnev: f-/l!lv Successfiil fs rl1e Sei;ure and Fortcill!re Progrwn ar Raising Rn·e111te und Dislrihuling Proceeds". 42 E\!ORY LJ. ll4lJ. 1167

( 1993).
25. See id. at ll 74.
26. See Solomon. sul'ra no k 24. at 11 t-:0.
27. Controlled Subqances Forfeiture Act. 4.2 PA. C.S.A. ~ 6tlll 1-61-:02.
2S. Act of April 14. 1'.172. P. l. 233. N u. 64. 35 P.S. ~ 7011-1 Ill er seq.
29. 42 PA. C.S.A. ~6SOl(c) - (hJ.
30. For example. a 1993 study in Arizona found that three-fourths of those who lost property in Arizona police seizures wer e never accused of any wrongdoing. and more than $4 mil lion in cash was seized from people nev e r charg e d with a crime. Eric Miller. 0 PS ro Close Fur((,irure Unir. Dirccror Nures l'o renriol Con/?icrs. ARIZ. REP UflLI C. Feb. 13. 1997. at B I .
.11. See. e.g .. Solomon . .\. llflr<l mste 24. at 1150.
32. See Erik Cirant Lun a. Ficrion Frumps Innoc ence: The /J ennis Cuurr"s C o nsriruriunal
l!u us e Of Cards. 49 STA"i. L RE v . 409. -132 ( llJlJT): see also Eric Blumenson & Ev:1 Nilsen. l'ulicing j(!l Prujlf· Till' Dmg \Vur"s llidden Econ o111ic Agenda. 65 U. CI!J. L REV. 35. Sh-84
( 1998) .
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·'Forfeit. forfeit , forfeit. Get mon ey . get money , get mon ey:··· A 1990
memo from the Attorney Ge neral admonished U.S . A ttorn eys to increase the volume of forfe itures in order to meet the Department of Jus14
tice 's annual budget target.
In addition , there is deep concern that current forfeiture law vests unfettered discre tion over the expendit ure of large sums of public moneys
15
in the hands of unelected officials, and permits expendi tures unrelated
to law enforcement objectives witho ut appropriate public acco unt a bility. '(> Cynicism and public distrust have bee n heightened by highly publicized insta nces of abuse. "
These legitimate concerns signal that the drug asse t forfeiture program. while well-intended and undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the
war on drugs, is in dire need of legislative reform at all levels."

I.

CO U RT-APPOINTED COUNSEL

Forfei ture actions filed under th e Pennsy lvani a Controlled Substances
4
Forfeiture Acr'" are civil cascs, " but in practice the y closely resemble
criminal proceedings. The cases are brought in the name of the Co m-

_)_) . Luna. supro note ~1 2. at -+3 3

11.l

Y0 .

.'4. !d. at 43 3. n.l'l'l: see also U nited States v. Jame s Da vid Good Rea l Prope rl y. 510 U.S .
43 . 5h. n.2 ( 1'1'13) (quoting Executi,·c O ffic e for Uni ted Stat es A ttorn~v s . 3S Unit ed Sta tes Attorncv 's Bulletin I ~() ( DOJ 1'190)).
35. See Edd ie O lsen . .V.J. Prowcutor Sd~n OJ/ r or/i:itlll't:S. PHIL . \. 1:\0 L' IRE R. Jun e IS.
1 '}9~. at A I (q uotin g a State Sena to r who conte nds tha t count y governm e nt-:md not a prosec utor appuintcd bv th e gove rn or-s hould decid e how hundreds of thousands uf public doll ars are
spen t).
3G. A mong th e qu esti one d uses of incn:asc d forfeiture funds by the County Pro s~cu tor
we re the purchases of two $ ll.IJOIJ h ~1ckclrop s used for the Co untv Prosc:c utur 's news co nferences. s ~e id.
37. Sa . e. g .. H .R . RF.P. i\n . lli 5- 3~S . Pa rt l. a t 23-27 (stories o! Wi llie Jones ~111d Bill \'
:VIunnerlyn . two \\'itncsses at .ludiciar v Committee hear ings): see uf.w Mich ae l lsikotf. Dmg
/( aids Net Mu ch \lulunhle l'ropat\'- , \nd Legal Upmur. WASH. POST. Apr. l. !'I'll. at AI
(re port in g the: fede ral seiz ure o r tine:.: fr ate rnit y ho u s~s at th<: U ni,·ers ity o l Vi rgini a wit h est imated ,·:tl u..: of s I mill io n for the cunfisca ti o n o r SC \'C ra l hundred dollars \\'Orth o r drugs): Lunct.
supra note 32. at 432 n.l94 (notin g that law e nforcem ent personne l use se ized te levisions and
sterccb in th e ir of fices) and ~ll 433 n.1'}5 ( nut ing that the distri ct attmn cv in Suffo lk Co untv.
'Je w Yo rk. dri ves a sei zed RMW 735i) : So lomon. supm note 24 . a t ll 7 l n.l 33 (desc ribi ng a
CiAO audi t that cli sco,·c rcd that'' DEA fie ld office had com·e rt ecl curi o cabinets and Norma n
Rock\\e il fi gurin es for official use) and at ll 7l n.UI> (not ing th at in sun1e c:1ses the DE A pl aced
ite ms in to o ffi ci al usc with ou t e\·e r process ing the fo rf.:i tt: d items): Platte . DulJ:v DitTrted US.
Dmg-Sci;urc Funds to Seacr Acc ounl Slwri((. L..-\. T I ~ IES. Nove mber l. lY90 (reporting that
drug seizure fund ,; of more than $30U.OOU we re not deposited in th e co unt y trcas urv and . ac cord ing to news accounts. we re diverte d to a secre t sh.: riff·s accoun t ).
3S. In an cxcclknt art icle on the subject o f civi l forfei tu re. :lt.lthors 13 lum enso n an d Nilsen
conc lude that while the m:lss i,·c: out pou rings o f mon ey and effort have pro du ced record numbe rs of drug seiZU I'c'S. asset for feitures a nd prosec ut ions. b\· mor.: mea ningful mea sures the dr ug
wa r hc1s bee n cm •"xtr au rdin c1ry failur e . Sa 131umenson & 'J ilsen . supra note .'2. at 37.
3'! . 42 PA. Cu c;s ST.-'. I .-\':N. ~~ h:-l Ul-ll2 ( Weq Jl)97 ).
-~0. Sec C u m nwnl\'c'~li th 1·. \ \ in ~ a it F:mm . (il)(J :-\.2d :222 ( P:1. 1997 ).
-
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mo nwea lth of Pennsylvania" and are prosecuted by th e local distri ct attorney 's office."c In Philadelphia, forfe iture hearings are held in the
C rimin al Justice Center, a newly constructed high-rise courthouse , specially designed to efficiently process the large numbe r of crimin al cases
arising ea ch year in a maj o r urb an center. All individuals enterin g th e
building are e lectronically search ed for wea pons before entering a bank
of elevators which deliver them to courtrooms on uppe r tloors. The elevators ope n to crowded hallways where prosecutors, defe nse lawye rs and
uniformed po lice officers sc urry to find the courtrooms in which their
cases will be call ed.
Forfeiture cases are assigned to Co urtroom 501. Once inside the
courtroom, cases are called from a list. They are prosec uted by the sam e
assistant district atto rne y and tried by th e same assigned judge , subject
o nly to infrequent rotation. Scores of indi ge nt citizens, disproportion ately
people of color, sit o n benches toward th e back of th e courtroom waiting
for th eir names (or descriptions of their pro perties) to be call ed aloud by
the clerk of t he court. The prosec utor an d court staff do most of th e
ta lking, pausing frequentl y to inquire abo ut th e prese nce of police officers expected to te stify in cases app earing on the co urt list. Most of th e
tim e, however. cases are simply co ntinued to new tri a l dates months into
the futur e. In the interim , private property seized by law en force ment
age ncies rema ins with in th e exclusive cus tody and cont rol o f the d ist rict
att orney's office.
!
It is cle ar tha t forfeitur e cases enjoy the full resources and powe r of
the sta te. U nlike civi l courtrooms in which the presid in g judge exercises
do minant cont rol , forfeiture court appears to rev olve around the ac tions
of the prosec ut o r. Cases proceed o r awa it new hearing da tes see mingly a t
the wi sh of th e prosecutor. P rop erty own e rs confused by th e court' s proced ures direct the ir inquiries to her. Exce pt for an occasional con tested
bea ring, the judge's role appea rs limited to approv in g rescheduled hearing dat es that have been mutuall y agre ed upon by th e prosec utor and too
sc hed uling clerk. \Vit ho ut knowing more. a casu a l observer wou ld alm ost
ce rt ainl y identify forfe iture co urt as a criminal co urtroom. It is a confusing and in timid atin g place.
On closer observat ion , however, the civil nature of the co urtro om beco mes more ev ident. T here are no public defenders prese nt a nd on ly occasion ally do es a private defense lawyer enter the cou rtroom. Indigent
pa rti es are alo ne. confused by the process and unsure o f wh at is expected
of them. T hey passive ly wait for lo ng periods o f time whi le ret aining

4 1. Sn · 42 P,\ CCJ 'JS. STAT. Ac; ~.
42 . S~ e -+2 P .-'.. C'CJ ~S. ST.\T. A'J".
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hope th a t they will regain their property once they tell their sto ri es to th e
judge .
Indi ge nt property owners come to forfeiture co urt with o ut an atto rney for many reasons. Some do not know that th ey may seek legal assistance or even that a lawyer might be helpful to them in such a proceeding. Unlike other civil actions commenced with a formal complaint and a
13
notice to defend that informs defendants in En g li sh and Spani sh where
they ca n go to obtain legal he lp, forfeiture proceedings are begun by a
petitio n'" and an a bbreviated notice which states simply that a default
45
judgment may be ent ered if a tim e ly response is not filed. The district
attorney's office do es not attach voluntarily th e more de tail ed notice to
defe nd.
In any event, indigent property owners lack the ability to pay a lawyer
and are therefore dependent entirely upon the availability o f free legal
assist ance in the local community. However, th e public d efe nder 's office
will no t re present th em because these are not criminal procee dings, and
th e loca l legal services program , already se rio usly under-fund ed and fac ing exploding cli ent de mand, cannot staff forfeiture cases even if they fall
within the program 's ever-narrowin g case acce ptance priorities. The privat e b ar's pro bon o program wo uld like to he lp , but also is overtaxed
with refe rrals for family law and child disability cases.
Th e truth is th at civil forfe iture cases fa ll be tween th e cracks of th e
public defender and legal services de livery syste ms. Indi ge nt homeowners mu st fend for th emselves, to o often with di sas trous res ults. It is no t
diffi cult to underst a nd wh y.
Ma ny low-income homeowners who come to fo rfeiture co urt are li ving on th e street or in homel ess shelters beca use their ho mes have already been seized by law enforce me nt authoriti es without ad vance noti ce
or an opportunity to m ake alterna tive living pl a ns. Mere ly surviving in
such a hostile environment consumes the ho meow ne r's tim e and energies . T hi s leaves th e m little capacity, time , or m o ney to pre pa re and fi le
re sponsive pleadings or to develop factual ev id ence in supp or t of th e ir
claims. It is unreaso na ble to beli eve that clients ca n mount a credible d efen se under such ad ve rse conditio ns.
Th e ci vil practice clinic at the U nive rsity of P enn sy lvani a Law Schoo l
acce pted its first dru g-related civil forfeiture case when a sin gle mother
-U. See Pa. R.C.P . 10 18. 1.
-14. Sl!e -12 P,\ CONS. STAT. A N N. ~ 6802( a ) (Wes t 1Y97) .
-1 5. See 42 P.-\ . CO:-<S. STAT. A NN . § 6802 (b) (requi ri ng tha t the not ice stat<: the fol lo,,·in g:
··Yo u arc: req uired to fil e a n a nswer to this pe ti tio n. sell in g fort h yo ur ti tle in. and right to pos session of. said prop ert y with in 30 da ys from the se rvice he reo f. and vo u arc also noti fi ed lin t. if
vou fa il to fil e s:1id answer. a defens e of forfeiture and conde mnation ,,·ill be ent ered again st
said proper ty.·").
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was thrust into the city's homeless shelter after her home was seized and
the district attorney's office filed a petition seeking forfeiture of the
house. The referral for help highlighted the need for access to counsel in
such important matters. The Commonwealth Court, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court, had previously ruled in a case of first impression that an indigent property owner was entitled to counsel in civil forfeiture cases under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amenclment.~ While acknowledging that the clue process clause historically required appointments of counsel only in cases threatening the
physical liberty of criminal defenclants,~ the Commonwealth Court interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Lassiter v. Department of Social Service/~ simply to create a presumption against appointment of
counsel where liberty interests were not involved. In the Court's opinion,
clue process protections might still require the appointment of counsel in
appropriate cases when applying the factors enumerated by the Supreme
Court in Mnthews v. Eldridge. ~Y
\Nhile Pennsylvania courts require that an indigent parent be informed of the right to free counsel in involuntary parental rights cases'"
and certain paternity actions," the Commonwealth Court noted that no
Pennsylvania appellate court, and only one non-Pennsylvania court. bad
answered the precise question of whether an indigent property owner
was constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel in civil forfeiture
actions.'' In a case known as United States\ v. 1604 Oceo!o, a district court
in Texas concluded that because there was little likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of property, court-appointed counsel was not required
where a property owner pled guilty to drug charges stemming from
transactions involving the home. However. the Oceola court expressly
limited its holding to the facts of that case, going to great pains to note in
dicta that the interests of a homeowner in maintaining a family home
upon which the mortgage had been paid for many years was substantial ,
and that the government's interest was less compelling where the home
was not a present danger to society. The Court viewed the forfeiture as
an attempt by government to exact an additional penalty upon th e
6

7

46. S ee Commonwealth v. S9.847.00 U.S. Currency. 637 A. 2d 736 ( Pa. Commw. C t. ll!LJ4 ).
-17. Se e id. at 742.
-lS. 4~ 2 U.S.l:-i(l'JX1).
4lJ. 424 l~ .S. 319 (1976).
511. Sec In rc Adoption of R.l. 312 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1973).
51. See Corra v. Coil. 451 /\. 2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1'JS2).
52. S ee United States v. 1604 Oceola. SU3 F.Supp ll'J-l (N .D. T ex 1'!9 2 ) (hereinafter
0CC<>la).
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homeowner'; for which the additional burden of appointing counsel
would not be overwhelming. The Oceola court continued:
Perhaps the most substantial imposition upon the government would be requiring the Plaintiff to oppose an attorney in a complicated and abstruse field
where the Plaintiff normally sxpects to meet only pro-se litigants struggling
through the claimant process.·

After the Oceola decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Austin v.
U.S. 5' that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment was applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that the Austin holding would require a different result in Oceola
because of the homeowner's increased likelihood of suffering an erroneous deprivation of property. Therefore, based largely upon the Austin
holding. the Commonwealth Court concluded that court-appointed coun5
sel for indigent property owners was constitutionally required. "
On the strength of the Commonwealth Court's ruling, the clinic filed
a motion requesting that counsel be appointed to represent the client.
The hope was that a favorable ruling at the trial level would have the
practical effect not only of insuring counsel in this case but also of leading
to routine court appointments in all of the prose forfeiture cases awaiting
adjudication. Unfortunately, the forfeiture judge decided not to grant any
such motions until the State Supreme Court completed its review of the
Commonwealth Courrs decision.
The landmark decision of the Commonwea lth Court was short-lived.
In 1997. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth
Court and expressly adopted the Lassiter presumption that an appointment of counsel is not constitutionally required in civil cases that do not
implicate a liberty interest.'' When applying the Mmhews v. Eldridge factors. the State Supreme Court found that the property interest at stake
commanded a lesser level of clue process protection, while the government's interest in deterring illegal drug activity by confiscating the profits
therefrom was significant. The Court also found the risk of erroneous
deprivation to be minimal and the burden to government of providing
counse l Lo an entire class of claimants to be substantial.'' As a result , the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
)3. Scc Oceola. 8()3 F. Supp. at 11 <.J7.
:i4. M
:'5. )lllJ U.S. 602 (lLJ<.J3).
56. See Commonwealth v. $LJ.:-;47 ()()U.S. Currency. 637 A. 2d 736. 7-14--17 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1'.19-1).
)7. See Commonwealth v. $9.8-17.1ll! U.S. Currency. 70-1 A.2d 612 (Pa. 19'!7). The case did
not raise the question of whether the governmental seizure of a L;milv home without advance
notice or opportunitY fur the Lunilv to make alternative living plans. thcrehv sul1Jecting the
familv to illlmclc."ncss. implic;ttcs a constitutionally protectecllibertv interest.
S0. See iJ at G16.
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Fo urte ent h Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel to
5
indioent
claimants in forfeiture cases. " Courts in at least eight other
0
states have agreed that co urt-appointed counse l is not constitutionally
. d .6U
req L!lre
While court-appointed counsel appears not to be constitutionally required in civil forfeiture proceedings , it is clear that Congress and state
legislatures may afford property owners greate r protection than what the
constitution requires. Indigen t homeowners in particular have substa ntial
interests at stake and do face a hi gh lik elihood of erroneous deprivation
for th e reasons previously discussed. In many such cases, homeowners
may never be convicted of any offense and some may n ot even be
charged with any wrongdoing. But, without counse l, they are likely to
forfeit their property in uncontested act ions or in hastily prepared contested actions where th eir pro se defenses offer little real hope of s uccess
61
against superior governmental resources.
6
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act. ' sponsored by Representati ve Henry J. Hyde""' and introduced in the H ouse of Represe ntatives on
J une 19. 1997, proposes important procedural reforms for federal forfeiture acti ons, including the appointm e nt of coun se l for indigent par ties in
appropriate casesr·• The proposed Act provides as follows:
(d) AP PO I:>HtE '\T or- COL<'SE L. -- (l) If the: person filin g a claim is fi nancially un ab le to obtain rep rese ntation by co unsel anti requests that counse l
be appointcd. the co urt may appoint counsel to rep rese nt that p erso n with
re spect to the claim. In d e termining whethe r to appoint cuunsel to re present
the person filing th e claim. the court sh a ll ta ke into acco unt·-(A) th e nature and value of th e property subj ect to fo rfe iture. in cludin g th e
hMd ship to the claim a nt from the lOSS o f the property sc: ized. CO!llp<tred tO
the expense of appointin g co unsel:

5lJ. Th e Co urt did not reach th .: issue of wh.;th.; r co urt -<lppoi nkd counse l i,; rn a ncla t.:d hv
the Pen nS\·[\·ania Constitu tio n. 51'~ id. a t Gl7.
GO. Sec. e.g .. Resc:k v. State. 7U6 P2d 2S8 (A la sk a 1\185) (decli ning to est:~bli s h a right to
cuunsc l but granting courts discretio n to ;1ppoint co unsel in fur fe iture proc.:cdin gs co nducted
pr im to criminal proceedings so th at the propert v ow ncr·s right against sel f-incrimin a tion can be
prote cted): Peopk v. :530,000 Un it ed Stat<:s Cu rrcncv . 35 Ca l. App. -l th 9.36 (Cal. C t. App.
19lJ5 ): State v. Tuipuapua . 925 P.2d .311 ( Ha\1. 1990): Stat.: v. One 1'190 Gco l'vk tro. 88\f P. 2d
\lilJ ( Ida ho JY95): In rc 8 \y. -!56 N. W. 2d 195 (Iowa J'J90): Stat.; v·. Prcclka. 555 N.W. 2d 21!2
(Iowa llJl)6): Ve rgari v-. Lockh a rt. 545 i\.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y . ."'.pp. Div. 1989) : 1-vlorge nth:w v·. Garci a. l-lS !\lise. 2d 900.561 N Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990): Stak n ref. Eik c nbc rrv v. Frodcrt.lJ2-l P. 2d Y33 (Wash. Ct. App. ILJ96).
61. It h;J s hcen suggested th at the absence o f cou nsel is one of the primary reaso n;; vv-hy at
least 80'Yo of civ il forfeitur e cases are not chal lerH!ed s~e H.!-{. R EP. No. 105 -35K. at 28-29
( 19lJ7) .
~
G2. H.R. \965. 105 th Con g. (1997) .
63 . u.S. House of Rep rcsentaiives . Illinois (6th District ). Representative Hyde is Chair of
the Hous e Co mmittee on the .Judic iary.
64. See H.R. 1965. ~ 2(cl) (Appo intm ent of Co unsel).
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(B) th e claimant's sta nding to conkst the forfeitur e : anJ
(C) wh e th e r th e claim a ppears to be made in good faith o r to be fr ivo lo us.

While this pro vision would not make court a ppointments of counse l
automatic, it would take a majo r step toward insuring tha t co unsel is appointed in appropriate cases. U nfortunately , thi s proposed refo rm (and
previous similar vers ions) has been pending for some time in Congress. r,;
Unqu estio nably, the D epartment of Justice has undermined this reform
effort by op posin g co urt-appointmen ts in federa l forfe iture proceedings.""
While the government's interes ts never go unrepresent ed in forfeiture
procee dings , th e D epa rtment apparently be li eves that a proper ty owner's
interes ts are adequate ly pro tected by the indi vidual's potential ab ility to
reco ver legal exp e nses in a successful acti on aga inst the Unit ed States
7
und er the E qual Access to Justi ce Ac t (EAJA)."
The Department's argument is plainly un convincin g. Only courtappointed co unsel will ass ure tha t indige n t property ow ne rs have th e
he lp of a lawyer in all a ppropriate civil fo rfeiture cases and , most importantly , from the ear lies t stage s of t he proceed in gs. In contras t, EAJA fees
will a t best serve as a very limi ted financial in ducem ent for some private
attorn eys to get involved in se lec te d cases, but only if an indigent prope rty ow ne r is abl e to e ngage in a sea rch for a lawye r and th e n is able to
convince the lawyer to take on prot racted li tiga ti on for continge nt remun erat ion under a fo rfeit ure statute that is strong ly weighted in favo r of
th e govern ment. Eve n if a lawyer takes a case an d wins it. EAJA fees still
are not guarant eed. Instead, the gove rnm ent is lik ely to oppose a motion
for EAJ A fees on the basis that th e g:overnment's action was s ubstan6
tially justifie d und er the sta tute . ' C olla te ra l li tigation chall enging the
lawye r's entitlement to EAJ A fees ancl opposing the am ount of comp en sable ho urs will almost ce rtai nly discourage private counsel from represe ntin g indige nt parties . If the avail a bility of EAJA fees is an acceptable
answer, why clo so m a ny property own ers go unre presented?

65. H .R. 1965 ( introduce d o n Jun e 19. 19'! 7 an d co -spo nso re d hv onl\· 3 rcprcsc mat ivcs) is
the m ost rccc n t ,·e rsio n of the propose d Civ il ,-\:;,;c t Fo rfe iture Rc fu n n .-\ct pro posed lw Re p resent a ti ve H vde . P ri or ve rs io ns in c lude H.R . l S35. l O:i th Ctmg .. int ruduccd o n Jun e· 10. l 'J'J7 w ith
2lJ cosponsors: I-l.R. 19 IIi . lO-lth Co ng .. imroducc:d on .J un e 22 . 19')5 " ·ith 23 cospo nsors: ;mel
H .R. 2-1 17. 103rcl Con g .. introduce d on Jun e 15 . I Y'i3 with (1 2 cos po nsors. Se e ulso H.R. 33-17.
103rcl Ccmg. (Asset Fo rfe iture Justice Act. introduced lw Repre senta tiv e Convcrs o n Octobcr
22. IY93)
6o. See Ci•·ii A sse/ Foi feiru re RefrJrJJJ , \cr: I fearing on I I. R. / 835 B e.fi,re rhe Conu nince u n
rhe .ltuliciun ·. 105 th Con g. Il l . 120 (1997 ).
67 . Sec id: see also Ci •'il Asscr Forf~iwrc 1\e!innt 1\ cr: !/eu ri11<; 011 // ./( N/15 Be/ine rite
Conunirree "II rite .ludiciurv . J().:f th Con g. 22LJ ( llJLJ6) .
·
.
(JK. See. e.g .. Unit e d Sta te s v. Duugl;t s. 55 F.3d :i S-l (l i th C ir. llJlJ:i ): C re;Hi\ e E lectri c v.
Lnit ed S ta tes . l 'J97 \VL 15 177'1 (N .D.N. Y. llJ'J7).
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M oreover, in state forfeit ure proceedings where th e United Sta te s is
no t a par ty, fe d eral EAJA fees obviously are not availabl e to indigent
property own e rs. On ly court-app oin ted co un sel in sta te procee din gs offer
indige nt prop erty own ers any m eaningful chance of safeguard in g vit al inte rests.
T he cost of providing court-appointed counsel ca n e as il y be p a id from
funds deposited in the federal or state forfeiture asset fund (wh ich e ver is
appropria te) without imposing any additional bu rden on ta xpa ye rs. To
keep lega l costs to a necessary minimum, co urt a ppointme nts co uld be
m a ndatory in those cases in which an indige nt family's hom e is at st ak e ,
a nd di scret io nary in all o ther cases. Courts can b e aut horize d to e xercise
tha t discretion in accordance with factors such as those proposed in the
69
C ivil Asset Forfe iture Re form Act. Only b y pro viding for the appointm e nt of counsel in both state and federal forfeiture proceedings can the
p ublic begin to have confiden ce that p rope r ty which is ultim ate ly fo rfeit ed t o th e gove rnm ent actually belongs in a forfe iture asse t fund and
th a t me ri torious defenses possessed by o rdinary ci tize ns are not sim p ly
aba nd o ned or drumm ed out becau se of superior government a l res ources .

II. DETAIL ED Pl; BLI C AC COUNTING OF FORFEITED A SSETS
Th e p ub lic al so has a compelling interest in kn mving thf precise n atu re a nd va lue of pri va te ly owne d assets forfe ited eac h yea r to law e nfo rcem e nt aut ho rit ies. W hil e fed e ral law requires the A tt orney G e n e ra l
to mak e an annual re po rt to Co ngre ss outlining th e va lu e of p rope rt y
lak en into the Fund,"' and the ending ba lanc e of th e Fund and p aym e nts
71
ma de to st a te and loc al law e nforcement agc ncies , the pub li c is not a ffor ded a mea ningful understa ndin g of the extent to w hich priva te properly is forfe ited eac h ye ar. C ongressio nal tes tim o ny fro m la w e nforce men t a uthorities re veal s that amounts flowing int o th e fed e ral F und a re
7
verv signifi ca nt ' Payme nts made to st a te and~loca l authorities by fed e ra l

6lJ. The Rdu rm Act \\'Oui d require a court to take int o account: th e nature and' a lue o f the·
propcnv su b jec t tL) foreclos ure. includ ing th e hardsh ip to the cl<iim ant fr om th e luss o f th e p rop ~ rl\ sc·i zc d. compared to th e expense of appo intin g counse l: th ~ claim ant·s sta ndin g to cont es t
th e fu rfeitu rc: and whe th e r the clai m appea rs to be mad e in good faith o r to be fri vo lous. Sec
H.R . 106.:1. 10.'ith Cong. ~ ::' (d) (1 LJ97).
711 . 2~ li .S.C. ~ 52.J (c)( 1) cre ate s the D ep artm e nt of Ju stice Assets Fo rfeiture Fun d to se ne
as the reposi to rv o f a ll fo rfei ted pro pe rt y se ized by th e D cpa rt m<: nt of Ju sti ce.
7 1. 2~ L.S.C. ~ 5:2.J (c)( !i ) require;; the A tto rn ey G en e ral to mak e this a nn ua l rep o rt.
72. On J ulv 2:2 . 1LJY6 . Stefa n D . Casse ll a. De puty Chie f. Asse t Forfei ture an d Mo n..:v La un ckring Sec tion of the DqJart m.: nt o f Ju s ti c~. testi fi ed before th e House Com m it tee on the Jud i,_·i~H \ th at the Fund received $3 25 mi ll io n (prujccted) in FY 19LJG . S.J07.5 mi lli on in FY l LJ\1~ .
S.'i-l<J .LJ mil liun in I LJ0.J. $)5:5.7 mill ion in FY 1903 . and $531 mi llio n in F't' 1'!92. See Ci1 if Asscr
Fur/(-iwrc i?ef(mn Au: f! corim; on H.R. / Y/6 Hef"ure 1he Conunillce on lh ~ .ludicitiiT. iii.Jth
Cc mg . -12. 2 16-2 17 ( 1lJLJ(i ). On J~illC 11. 1907. Mr. c:rssclla re port ed to th e Hou se ConH1;itte c O il
!l~<c .iudicia n · th~ll !"i na! figures for FY l lJLJ(i a mou nted to $331\. 1 mi llion and th at fi rst q ua rter
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a uthoriti es through equitabl e sharing arc also sizable. W hi le to tal forfe iture fi gures are rep orted to Congress pursuant to fe d eral sta tute. the
p ublic has no d eta ile d information on the so urces of fo rfe ited p roperty
and mo st import a ntly on wh at imp act th e se izure and forfe iture of priva te prope rty is having on local communities.
Simil a rly, there a re onl y minimal re porting requirem ents fo r asse ts
forfe it ed und er sta te forfe iture laws . For exa mple , u nde r Pennsylvania
law , every county is require d to provide an annual audit to th e state attorney ge neral of all fo rfeited property and proceeds. '• Howeve r, this
7
a ud it is not to be ma de public. ' Th e state a tt orney ge neral is then re q uired to submit an annu a l report to the appropriatio ns and judiciary
committees of bo th houses of the legisla ture on the proceeds derived
fro m the sa le of fo rfe ite d p ro perty and the use mad e of unsold forfe ited
property.''' B ut on ce again , the public is not given a de tailed report of th e
so urces of these fun ds, nor, more im portantl y, a dem ogra p hic summ ary
77
of citizc ns ad ve rse ly affected by fo rfe itures or an assessment of the im7
pac t of fo rfe ited rea l prope rty on loca l communiti es. '
Detail ed, pu blic a uditing o n all leve ls will foc us increased national at te ntio n o n th e vas t amo un ts o f pri vate proper ty fo rfeited each year to law
e nfo rceme nt agenCi es . Whil e law enfo rcem e nt acti vities are an o bvious

J'i;>.u rcs fo r FY 1997 were SilO mill ion. Civil A sse r Fo rf~irurc Rc(r! m l Acr: /-!e(lrin g on H R. 1835
B~f(,rc rile Connnirree un rl1e Ju diciurv . liJ:ith Con g. 11 6 ( l ')97 ).
73. Cas,;c lla ·s tes tim o ny re ports tha t payments mad e to sta te and loc;1l agencie s :\mounted
to 5 17'\ millio n (projected ) in FY l'I'Jn. S228.7 milli on in FY llJ95. and $:> 2X. lJ millio n in FY
ILJ<J-f. ~:>2-f.' mi ll iu n in FY Jl)93. and S2-16.n mil liun in F Y 1992 . See l-I eu rin g on HR. J<Jin . 'IIJir''
nok 7 !. On .Jun e: 11.1 997 . Mr. Casse ll a repor ted to the House Comm ittee un th e Jud ici arv th <lt
final ligures fo r FY llJLJii a mounted to 5163 .4 mi ll ion and that fi rst quarter figures for FY l'J'J7
,,·e re _>'\.1 mill io n. See Hearing on HR . IS35.supra note 7 !.
7-+. S,·c -12 P.-\ . CO\S. SnT. A\:'1. 680 l( i) (\Vest 19'!7).
7'\. Sn· id.
76. Se e 42 P.\. CONS. STAT. AN N .~ 680l(j ) (Wes t Jl)l)7). T he a tt ornev general is re qu ired 10
<ld npt proced ure> a nd guid e lines gove rning the re lease of in forma ti on lw local co u1Hi cs to prot~ct the cnnfidcn ti al it v o f fmfc:itecl property o r procc·c:cl s used in o ngoi ng drug cnlorc-: me nt by
:IUtlwrities.
77 . Oue >tio ns h:l\·c: bee n raise d as to whe the r th e civi l fo rfeit ure program uses raci:illl·
ha >c·d prufil ing :mel d ispro po rt ionately se izcs propertv from racial mino ritic,;. S ec. e.g . . Soinnllln .
.\llf>W no te 2-l. at 1185: Cil'il r\ sser Fur(eiw re RefrJrl/1 A cr: J-J earing on 1-J.R. I'Jif> Be((m · rile
Conu ninee un rlu· .ludician·. l04th Cong. 290- 29 1 ( 1996).
7 ~. ln cases that in vo lve th e se izure of a low-inc o me fa mi lv" s house. it app ea r,; th:ll tlK·
building maY then be boa rded up fo r lo ng peri ods of ti me. th e rdw furth e r colll r ibuting tu urh:1n
blic: ht and h i ~h ,·acanc v ra te s in low-inco me nc i ~ hbor h oncls. It mav also become the :<ubject of
br:ak -in s. va~1 cla l ism. ,; nd eve n ill ega l drug ac tiv ity bv i ndivi dua l ~ un co nncctccl to th e .hou se.
L"e"l prosc cutu rs concc rk that asse t fo rfe itures co nvc v to th e m a sma ll e mpi r•: uf mcKicq pn•p e rtic: s \\hich prove vc:ry di ffi cul t to dis pose of. See Cra ig R. McCoy. Sei~e rl l fuu scs To u .~h ro
Unload. Pi-ttL\. 1:\QL'mER . .Jan. 17. l<J92 . at Bl. The publ ic should know what f'nlpc rli cs a re
" ·ithin th e in ve ntory or law e nfo rce me nt a uthor ities and \\·hat steps arc being taken in :1 tinr el \·
mannc: r tn return those propertic·s to produ cti ve use . Sec', e.g. . B:nba ra Ba rr•ct. Dnrg Tusk
fun,· ·s Rc·wrds Cu 1erc·rlln· Vei l o(Sccrcc v. Y OR I( DAt L\ · R ECOR D. Dec. 21. l 'llJ7. :I t,.\ !_ 1'!'17
Wl.. l-l.':i .>2 1Jl (rcpurtin g u i1 the nee d for p.ubli c <1 Uc.liti ng of state forfeiture fu nds)
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priority for th e use of forfeited assets , they s hou ld no longer be the only
priority. 7" The curre nt mandate to give virtually all forfeited assets to law
enforcement age ncies ev idences an ill-co nce ived , legislative choice th at
emphasizes appreh ension and punishment of drug activity to the virtual
exclusion of prevention of drug use. Th e time has come to acknowledge
that reducing the demand for drugs, espec ia lly among young Americans,
is as important to the war against dru gs as prosecuting offenders who
vio late state and fede ra l drug la ws . ~"

III. RED IR ECTIO N OF FORFEITED ASSET FUNDS
\

Current legisla tive reform efforts in Co ngress focus primarily on procedural changes needed to improve the fairn ess of the forfeiture process.
01
They do not, however, propose to realloc ate forfei ture fundS. As proce dural reform rem ains on the horizon, '' hundreds of millions of forfeiture
do llars continue to flow almost exclusive ly to law enfo rcement agencies.
In contrast to th e federa l modeL a handful of states have alloca ted
so me or all of the ir state forfeiture fund s to purposes other th a n law e nfo rcement. Californi a. for exampl e . directs th a t fiftee n percent of for fe iture funds go to co mb at drug abuse and to dive rt ga ng activity whil e
twe nty-four perce nt of th e funds arc de posited in the state 's ge ne ra l
fund -'' Indi ana places co ntrol of for fe ited goods in the hands of the state
board of pharmacy and directs that net funds from their sale go to th e

79 . In fact. so nk comm en tators argue q u ite pe rsua sive ly th a t no funus shou lu go to law en ·
fo rce ment age ncies a nd that a ll funds should go int o the ge nera l trca sur v. therebv e limin a ti ng
anv con fli c t o f interest crea tc·J by law e nfo rce m e nt· s pecuniary int eres t in civil for fe itures. See.
e.g .. Blurn e nso n & N ilse n. supro note 32. Ho\\"eve r. the chan ces o f such d ra s ti c c h a nge in the
alipca tio n of fo rfe iillre funds arc. a t be st. e'\ trc m elv re mote. Eve n th e more m o dest co ncep t.
suggc:stc: d hy thi s :1rtick. of s hari ng fo rfe it ure funds " ·as p rc vio uslv p roposed in The Asse t Forfei ture J ustice r\c t int roduced by Representative Cunyc: rs in 1993 bu t it. too. fZ~ikd to win su tli ·
ci ent legislative suppo rt at that time. Sec I-!.R. 33.\7. J03d Co n g .. 15 ( 1993) .
SO. See Melodv lvl. Heaps &. James :\ . Schwartz . Tu"w ·d u Ruriunul Drug Policy: S,•rring
.Ve''" !'riorirics. 1'JlJ-l L!. C t·IJ. LEG . F. I 7". (emph asiz in g th e need to trc:lt the demand f,Jr dr ugs
through aggre SS i\" C :llld i" L'Cu sc d tre:Jtmcnt. education ancl preve nti o n pmgrams).
Sl. ·r hc C ivi l Asset Fo rfeiture R~.Jurm Ac t proposes important proceclural chang es
(:1ppointm ent of co un se l. reaso rwbk notice to property owners. in crea se in the governm e nt 's
b urden of proo f. etc.) bu t Joc s no t address a rea lloca tion of fo rfeiture fund s. Under pre ssure
from the White H o use a nd th e Dcp:ntme nt of .Ju sti ce . the C ivil Asset Fo rfeiture Re form r\ c t
(!-l.R. 1835) was reworked a nd in troduced o n June !9. 1997 as H.R . 1965 . The newly revise d bi ll
a ttracted on lv three cosponsors (a s opposed to 29 cos pon so rs on H .R. 1835) and ha s ga th e red
considerable oppos it io n from p rev io us sup po rte rs. such as th e AC L U and th e N R r\. beca use it
atte mpts to C'\pa nd the reac h of fo rfe itu re law. S<:e Blu me nso n & Ni lse n. sup m note 32. a t !On
n.273: Editoria l. A Burch~d Re{nmt . 0R;.c; c.;E C OUNTY R EG ISTER. Octobe r 27 . !997. at 86.
S2. On Jun e ! 9. ! 997 the C ivil Asset Fo r fe itu re Rdo rm Ac t (H.R. 1'165) was referred to th e
House Committees on Com m e rce . Ways and Mean s and th e judiciarY. The referral s to Co m mittccs on \Va vs and Mea ns and Cu rnmcrce \\"tre e xt e nckcl fo r a pe riod tu end not lat e r th a n
A ug ust 7. !9lJS.
S3. Sc ~ C-\L. H E.-\LTH & S.-\FET Y CoDe.~ I l.\8l)( a)(2)(.-\) (\\'es t i 9lJ7).
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common school funds of the state .'" Under Missouri's state constitution ,
5
forfeiture proceeds go to public schools ." Wisconsin , as welL uses some
of its proceeds for th e sta te school fund -"" New J ersey directed 10% and
5% of forfe ited funds in the first two years, respectively, of the law 's ap7
plication to the H epatitis Inoculation fund ." Georgia authorizes some
proceeds to go to victim-witness assistance programs and th e representation of indi ge nts in criminal casess"
Pennsylvania is typical of man y s t ates, '~ however, in th at it directs that
forfeit ed property or proceeds be utilized almost exclusively for law enforc ement purposes.Yo In 1994. Pe nn sy lvania am ended its Controlled Substance Forfeiture Act to provide that " in appropriate cases, the district
attorney and the attorney general m ay design ate proceeds from forfeited
property to be utilized by community-based drug and crime figh ting programs and for relocati on and protec tion of witn esses in criminal cases. "'"
However, legislative history revea ls that th e o nly apparent purpose of
this amendment was to clarify co nflictin g law e nforcem ent inte rpretations of whether distr ict a ttorn eys were authorized to con vey drug forfeiture funds to local D. A .R.E. proj ects. n Occas iona l news accounts revea l
that only token grants are give n to drug preve ntion groups by law enforcement authorities. T hese small amounts a re more likely inten ded to
curry political fa vo r than to make a meanin gful impact on drug pre ven .

q;

t!On . .

The nation may be in danger of los ing th e war o n dru gs .''" T he ke y to
winning at least some decisive battles in the near future may hin ge up on
the development of innovative and aggressive strategies that see k to stabilize the high-pove rty com muniti es most vict imized by dru g activit y and
that offer intensive treatment, educa tion and prevention services.'" In
short, the demand for cl rugs mu st be curtailed.

8-+. Sef [;o.;D. CO DE A N:\. * 11'i--+2-20-:i (e) (I) ( West IY97).
S5. i'v[O. Co;.;sT. an IX.~ 7. See. also . \ '10. A:-;N . ST.-'.T ~ 51 3 .623 (West 19Y1\) .
86 . See \VJSC. STA T~ l)6 l. :i:i ( 1997).
87 See NJ ST,\TAN\. S 2C:h4 -6(~t) (\Vest 1995)
i'i/\. Sec GA . CODE A ;o.;!'. ~ 16-!3 -49 ( 1997).
SY. See Blumcn so n & Nilsen. ,;upm note 32 . a t 52 n.6t1.
90. Fo r fei ture funds arc to be usee\ fur th e pu rposes of enfo rci ng the prm·is ion s o f th e s ta te
Controlled Subs tance. Dru g. DeY icc and Cosmetic Act. See -+ 2 P.-\. C'Oi'S STAT. A:-;1'. ~ 6SU1 (f)
(West ]997).
91. 42 PA. CO i\S. STAT. ANN. ~ 68Ul(h ) (\Vest 19\17).
lJ2 See Rema rks of Re p. M. N . Wr ight on S.B. 313. Le gislative Journ a l- House. Vol 111.
Nov. 21. l 99-+. a t !9-+U.
93. For example. a mini-grant o f 'i> 1.000 fro m se ized assets was a"·a rd e d to a high school
anti-drug m ga nization. See \Vh it nev D. G ree r. Cnn{i.IDIIed Dmg /l ouse Offered .fin Sa le In
!'uhlic. li\TELL ICEi\CER J OU RNAL. Lancaster. Pa .. June 20. 1Y':!5 . at back page .
'!-+ Sec. e.g .. John Ka\' e . f'rniden(s :Y! e.\Silge . 3 1 Mar. -Apr. PROSECUTOR 5 ( 1997) .
05. See Heaps & Schwart z . .'dlf} rn note XO.
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Drug forfe iture proceeds on a!J levels can help fund this needed ap proach. Federal and state forfeiture allocation laws~'· sho uld be modified
to provide that no less than fift y percent of all forfe ited fund s, net of
moneys expended in providing court-appointed counsel to indige nt property owners, should be made available to es tablish special services districts in high-poverty communities that are most adversely affected by
drug activity. Special services districts have proven to be successful models for delivering intensi\Xe services to defined neighborhoods where tra 7
ditional govern m ental services have enjoyed on ly minimal success." Usually, special districts are establishe d in downtown business areas or in
neighborhoods that are home to large, private institutions able to afford
the additional revenues needed to fund special districts.ys For this reason ,
neighborhoods of concentrated pove rty have great difficulty es tablishing
and supporting effective special services districts.~"
Howeve r, forfeiture asset funds could hold the financial key to establishing joint public-private infrastructures th a t would allow the highpove rty neighborhoods most victimized by drug activity to become special services districts. Once es tablished, these districts could id entify the
intensive se rvices they believe to be most needed within their comm uniti es and then purchase those services from those non-profit organizations
that have demonstra ted rea l s uccess in serving low-income communities.
Priority uses of forfeit ure asse t fund s, fo r example. might include general
anti-poverty initiatives such as housi ng and communit y development. jo b

96. State legislati ve re form will n o t be effective so lun g as federal adoption o f state fo rf.:i tures permit law enforceme nt a uthoritie s to bypa ss sta tes alloca tion req uire ments by
.. fe deralizin g .. local forfe itures. Legis la tive refo rm mu st occur at ~dl kve ls. Sc:e Blumenscln &
N ilse n. supra no te 32. al II L
'J7 . Spe c ia l se rvi ce di stricts are orga nize d w pe rform speci fi ed gove rnmentctl functio ns and
~tr e ge nerallv go vern e d bv a board of directors whic h posses ses administrative imkpcndcncc
from other unit s of gove rnment. Such district s have fin ancial and reve nue powe rs and are gen e rall v se pa ra te corporat e e ntiti es. See Da vid J. Ke n ned\·. R es1ra ining file Pmn:r of Business l m f'I"<JV~ II lenl Disu"ic!s: Th e Cme of !he Grand Cen1ral Pannership . 15 Y.-\ LE L. & P o L· Y REV. 283.
286 (lLJ96). While spec i<d se rvi ce di st ricts hav e e njuvcd cons iderable success . th ev ab o pre s•:nt
unique challenges to in su re that thc y adhere to de mocratic pr inciple s in clccision -111'tk ing. S ec id.
at 32<J.
98. For exa mpl e. a spec ia l serv ices district in Ce nte r C it y (do\\·nto\\·n) Ph i!J de lphia ie,· ics a
tax for its se rvices while a special serv ice s di stric t in University Citv. Phil a delphia is pa id for bv
volunt an· payme nts fr om such large institution s as the Uni·cers it y of Penrbv h·ani a. Drew ! Uni ve rsity. C hilclre n·s H o>p ita l of Phila de lphia. AMT RAK. and the Un iversi tY C it y Sc ie nce C~n
tcr. sc~ Edit o ria l. Posifi l't' S!eps: Th e Ne tv Universitv Cill' [)is/rio is {-{;>/ping {II f?t'S / Ort' fill'
Neighbo rl10od Feel uf Plliladclph ia. PHIL\. I NQu i R ER. N<J\·c mb e r 15. 19'37 . a t .'\ 1::>.
99 . The Ce nter City spe cial services distri ct ha s enjoy ed co nsi ckrab le success in meetin g it s
ove rall obj ec tives. In re fl e cting upo n that succ ess . State Representative Dwigh t Evam of Phil ~l 
delp hia stated in a town meet ing ... The ques ti on I hear over and ove r again is: W h v can·t \\·e
take that sa me knowledge ( referrin g to th e Cen te r Cit y d ist rict"s success in p ro du cing a s;·1fer
d o wntown area) and translate it to loc ation s a li ove r th e citv ., .. See Howard Gllodm an. Sn!u liom In Plliludelphia C ri111e Top Town Aleering , \ g cndll Celller Citv"s S u cuss is 1-~nv ied. Pltl L-\.
l00L' IRER. D ec. 19. 19LJ7. at Bl.

524

A ccess to Ju stice and Civil For feiture R efo rm
crea ti on, a nd free civil lega l ser vices to the poor, as \Veil as sp eci fic a nti drug initi atives such as drug tre atment, educa tion and p reventi on ser vices. These efforts would be a imed a t stabili zing fa mili es, insuring ade qua te housing an d educa tion al opportunities, and offering youn g peop le
productive alterna ti ves to the attractions of the st reet. This in fusion of
much-neede d cap ita l, m a nage d a t the loca l leve l by respo nsive sp ec ial
services dist ricts, would help to re duce the dem a nd for drug use by
stre ngthening neighborh oods a nd empowerin g be leaguere d communities
to take re al contro l ove r their own des tinies. If law enforce ment agencies
re ally wan t the civil forfe iture progra m to help the m win the war on
drugs, th ey must be willing to sh a re the tools needed to ge t the job d one .
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